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Abstract We introduce a new solution concept to problems with externalities,
which is the first in the literature to take into account economic, regulatory and
physical stability aspects of network problems in the very same model. A new
class of cooperative games is defined where the worth of a coalition depends on
the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. We allow for
coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence
agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate
extension of the classical core concept, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this
new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment.
A prominent application, a game of consumers and generators on an elec-
trical energy transmission network is examined in details, where the power
in- and outlets of the nodes have to be determined in a way, that if any line
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instantaneously fails, none of the remaining lines may be overloaded. We show
that fulfilling this safety requirement in a mutually acceptable way can be
achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core.
Keywords partition function form games · uncertainty · core · sustainability ·
networks · game theory · externalities
1 Introduction
Cooperative game theory analyzes how the gains of cooperation is to be di-
vided among the members of a coalition. The most famous solution to this
problem is the core (Gillies, 1959). In a classical, static cooperative game it
is implicitly assumed that players can make binding agreements regarding the
allocation of the value of a coalition if they cooperated. In most real life situ-
ations the core is not applicable, since its assumptions are too restrictive. At
the same time cooperative game theory is often criticized for not being able to
incorporate externalities appropriately. In this paper we introduce a new class
of transferable utility games, where we allow for dynamics, uncertainty and
externalities as well, and propose an extended notion of the core as a solution
to this game which relaxes its restrictive assumptions.
Dynamic cooperation, cooperative games with more than one time periods,
has already been studied by a number of papers. The introduction of dynamics
only, already raises a crucial question; namely what are the consequences of a
current deviation for the future, or more precisely, how to define a profitable
deviation? Different answers to this question lead to different solution con-
cepts. Habis and Herings (2011a) give a comparison of all these concepts in a
two-period general equilibrium setting and conclude that the Weak Sequential
Core is the most satisfactory concept so far. Habis and Herings (2011b) intro-
duce transferable utility games with uncertainty, define the Weak Sequential
Core in this setup and give its characterization.
In many cases the value of a coalition may well depend on the behavior of
the rest of the players, thus we may have externality among coalitions. These
situations can be modeled by partition function form games, introduced by
Thrall and Lucas (1963). They take the pessimistic approach that residual
players aim to minimize the payoff of the deviators. This idea is in the spirit
of the α-core (Aumann and Peleg, 1960), defined for NTU-games, where it is
assumed that a coalition deviates only if it gets a higher payoff irrespective
of the induced partition of the rest of the players. Its complete opposite is
the optimistic approach of the ω-core (Shenoy, 1980), where deviators expect
to be helped by residuals. A more rational reaction is applied in the γ-core
(Chander and Tulkens, 1997), where the deviating coalition must face individ-
ually best responses. Here it is true again, that different assumptions regarding
residual behavior may lead to further different solution concepts. Here we will
concentrate on the Recursive Core by Ko´czy (2007), since it is less sensitive to
optimism or pessimism than the α- and ω-cores, furthermore allows a rational
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residual response as the γ-core, but this response is general, endogenous and
consistent with the solution of the main game.1
In this paper we will combine the above two directions of research, and
allow for the presence of uncertainty and externalities at the same time by
introducing the partition function form game with uncertainty (hereafter PFU-
game). A PFU-game consists of two time periods, 0 and 1. In period 1 one out
of a finite number of states of nature may materialize and conditional on the
state, the players are involved in a particular partition function form game.
An outcome therefore specifies a payoff-partition configuration conditional on
each possible state of nature. A utility function is then used to assign a utility
level to each profile of state-contingent payoffs.
We are interested in the appropriate definition of the core of a PFU-game.
In this setting coalitions (forming some partition) are allowed to form in both
time periods. Stability requires that a suggested allocation cannot be blocked
by any coalition at any period, i.e. both before and after the resolution of un-
certainty. If one would allow for binding agreements (Ray and Vohra (1997) or
Predtetchinski et al (2002)) in our stochastic setting, then the game would be-
come formally equivalent to a non-transferable utility game. We, on the other
hand, are interested in the case where agents cannot make such fully binding
agreements. Instead, agents will not stick to their agreements concerning the
future if after the resolution of uncertainty, they are better off when deviating.
Hence, we only allow for self-enforcing agreements in the spirit of Ray (1989)
and Habis and Herings (2011b). These considerations lead to the concept of
the Sustainable Core. Extending the characterization of the Weak Sequential
Core (Habis and Herings, 2011b); We say that an allocation belongs to the
Sustainable Core only if – conditional on the state of nature – it belongs to
the Recursive Core of the PFF-game related to that state, and moreover there
is no coalition (forming some partition) in period 0 that can propose state-
contingent Recursive Core elements of the game restricted to that coalition
which gives its members higher utility.
An application of the PFU-game is the electrical energy transmission net-
work, where consumers and generators need to find a stable allocation of power
in- and outlets, taking into account possible line failures. Csercsik and Ko´czy
(2011) show that both negative and positive externalities exist in a static elec-
trical energy transmission network game of generators and consumers, and
therefore suggest the Recursive Core as a solution concept. Here we extend
their example by the possibility of line failures in the grid, which creates the
uncertainty. We show that the Sustainable Core can be used to find a solution
to this extended game.
The organization of the paper is as follows. First we introduce the notation
and the definition of the core for the PFF-game in Section 2 followed by the
definition of the PFU-game and our solution concept in Section 3. The appli-
1 Further desirable properties are discussed in (Ko´czy, 2006).
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cation to the electrical energy transmission network is analyzed in Section 4
in detail, finally Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players, and its non-empty subsets are
the coalitions, denoted by C. A cooperative game with transferable utility, or
characteristic function form game, is a pair (N, v), where v : 2N → R is a
characteristic function which assigns to each coalition C ⊆ N its worth v(C),
with the convention that v(∅) = 0.
2.1 Partition Function Form Games
A partition P is a set of disjoint coalitions; P = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm}, where
their union is N ; i.e., players in set S cooperate if and only if S ∈ P . The
set of partitions is P and the set of partitions of C ⊂ N is P(C), with a
typical element P (C). A partition function; w : P → (2N → R) assigns a
characteristic function to each partition. A cooperative game with transferable
utility in partition function form, or briefly PFF-game, is a pair (N,w), and it
is an extension of the characterization function form game where we allow for
externalities across players and coalitions; hence, the worth of a coalition may
be different in each partition. For C ∈ P , let the worth w(C,P ) denote the
amount that the players in C can guarantee themselves by cooperating, when
the coalition C is embedded in the partition P . An outcome is a pair (x, P ),
consisting of a payoff vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RN satisfying feasibility;∑
i∈C x
i ≤ w(C,P ) for all C ∈ P , and a partition P ∈ P . The payoff for
a coalition C is a vector xC = (xi)i∈C ∈ RC . Let us denote the the set of
outcomes in (N,w) by Ω(N,w).
In a PFF-game whether a coalition has a profitable deviation, depends on
the induced partition of the players. There are a number of ways to model the
reaction of the remaining players, which lead to different solution concepts.
Here we concentrate on the Recursive Core by Ko´czy (2007), that allows the
remaining, residual players to freely react, and form a core-stable partition be-
fore the payoff of the deviating coalition is evaluated. Thus, given a deviation,
the residual players face the problem of solving another, smaller PFF-game.
We call this a residual game.
Definition 1 Consider a game (N,w) and a player set R ( N . Assume
R = N \ R have formed the partition P (R) ∈ P(R). Then the residual game
(R,wP (R)) is the PFF game over the player set R with the partition function
given by wP (R)(C,P (R)) = w(C,P (R) ∪ P (R)).
Observe that the subset of players in the residual game still experience the
externalities from the players in R. Hence, if the core is the solution for (N,w),
then the core solves the residual game (R,wP (R)) as well. The definition of the
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residual game is similar to that of the reduced game (Moulin, 1985), where
the payoff structure of the larger game is accounted for, but the significance
of the partition of R is not considered.
Next we define the Recursive Core in the spirit of (Ko´czy, 2007).
Definition 2 ((Pessimistic) Recursive Core) For a single-player game
the (Pessimistic) Recursive Core is trivially defined. Now assume that the
(Pessimistic) Recursive Core RC−(N,w) has been defined for all games with
|N | < k players. For an |N |-player game an outcome (x, P ) is dominated if
there exists a coalition Q and a feasible payoff vector yQ ∈ RQ, such that
for all (yQ, yQ, Q ∪ P (Q)) ∈ Ω(N,w) we have yi > xi for all i ∈ Q and
if RC−(Q,w
Q) 6= ∅ then (yQ, P (Q)) ∈ RC−(Q,wP (Q)). The (Pessimistic)
Recursive Core RC−(N,w) of (N,w) is the set of undominated outcomes.
Definition 3 ((Optimistic) Recursive Core) For a single-player game the
(Optimistic) Recursive Core is trivially defined. Now assume that the (Opti-
mistic) Recursive Core RC+(N,w) has been defined for all games with |N | < k
players. For an |N |-player game an outcome (x,P) is dominated if there exists
a coalition Q and an outcome (y, P (Q) ∪ P (Q)) ∈ Ω(N,w), such that yi > xi
for all i ∈ Q and if RC+(Q,wP (Q)) 6= ∅ then (yQ, P (Q) ∈RC+(Q,wP (Q)).
The Optimistic Recursive Core RC+(N, V ) of (N,w) is the set of undomi-
nated outcomes.
In the following we will use the pessimistic approach for the Recursive Core.
The Recursive Core is always well-defined. Note that any Recursive Core ele-
ment consists of a stable payoff allocation and a corresponding stable partition
of the players.
According to Definition 2 a deviating coalition Q has to evaluate the profit
it can achieve based on the outcome of the residual game, where a rational
residual behavior is expected. We assume conservatism of the deviators only
among the remaining possible outcomes in the following sense. If the Recursive
Core of the residual game is nonempty, then the members of coalition Q expect
the lowest possible payoffs of the stable outcomes (y,Q ∪ P (Q)) ∈ Ω(N,w)
with (yQ, P (Q)) ∈ RC(Q,wP (Q)). If the Recursive Core of the residual game
is empty, then the payoff of the members of the deviating coalition must be
higher than the given one regardless of the coalition structure of the residual
players.
Based on the concept of the Recursive Core, a minimal claim function
can be defined, which describes the minimal claim of each coalition in the
corresponding PFF game reduced to that coalition. This function, termed vmc
in the following, may be applied in the same spirit as a characteristic function,
since it assigns a unique value to each coalition, which they can secure for
themselves if they deviated. The formal definition of vmc is as follows.
Definition 4 Let us consider the residual game (C¯, wC) over the player set C
defined by the partition function wC(K,PC) = w(K,PC∪C) whereK ∈ PC ∈
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P(C). Let us denote the Recursive Core of the residual game by RC(C¯, wC).
The minimal claim function vmc can be defined as
vmc(C) =
{
min∑
i∈C
xi{Ω(N,w)|(x, P
C ) ∈ RC(C¯, wC)} if RC(C¯, wC) 6= ∅
min∑
i∈C
xi{Ω(N,w)} if RC(C¯, w
C) = ∅
where vmc(C) is the minimal claim of coalition C.
With the help of the minimal claim function, a characterization of the
Recursive Core can be given as follows.
Lemma 1 The Recursive Core RC(N,w) of the game (N,w) is a collection of
outcomes (x, P ) ∈ Ω(N,w), such that there is no coalition C with vmc(C) >∑
i∈C x
i.
Proof Holds by construction.
3 Games with Uncertainty
We model uncertainty in a dynamic setup; we consider a game with two pe-
riods, t ∈ T = {0, 1}. In period 1, one state of nature s out of a finite set
of states of nature S occurs. We define the state of nature for period 0 as
state 0, so the set of all states is S′ = {0} ∪ S. Our interest is clearly in the
cases with non-degenerate uncertainty; |S| > 1. In period 1 the players are
involved in a PFF-game Γs = (N,ws), where the game itself is allowed to be
state-dependent. Period 0 serves as a point in time prior to the resolution of
uncertainty.
Player i ∈ N evaluates his payoffs by a utility function ui : RS → R,
which assigns to every profile of payoffs xi = (xi1, . . . , x
i
S) ∈ R
S a util-
ity level ui(xi) and is assumed to be continuous and state-separable, i.e.
ui(xi) =
∑
s∈S u
i
s(x
i
s), where u
i
s(x
i
s) is monotonically increasing. A well-known
example of utility functions satisfying these assumptions is the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function.
3.1 The Model
A PFF-game with uncertainty is defined as follows.
Definition 5 A partition function form game with uncertainty (PFU-game)
Γ is a tuple (N,S′, w, u) where w = (w1, . . . , wS) and u = (u
1, . . . , un).
Note that state 0 merely serves as a point in time where players face future
uncertainty and may decide to cooperate (to pool risk for instance).
The outcome of the game is an ordered pair (x, P ) where the matrix x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RS×N is called an allocation, and P = (P1, . . . , Ps) a partition
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for each subgame. Let Ω(x, P ) denote the set of outcomes in Γ . The state-
s component xs = (x
1
s, . . . , x
n
s ) ∈ R
N of an allocation is referred to as the
allocation in state s ∈ S. The set of partitions in Γs is Ps and the set of
partitions in Γs of C ∈ N is Ps(C) with a typical element PCs . Let Γ
R
s denote
the residual PFF-game played in state s by player set R. The payoff allocation
matrix must satisfy a feasibility constraint; given the partition P , for all C ∈ P
we have
∑
i∈C x
i
s ≤ ws(C,P ) for all s ∈ S. The central question of a PFU-
game is finding a stable outcome.
We study which outcomes of the game Γ are stable. In general an outcome
is stable if no coalition ever can benefit from a deviation. That is, we require
that there should be no blocking possible in the subgames in t = 1 or before
the resolution of the uncertainty in t = 0.
Thus we will require from a stable outcome (x, P ) of the game Γ that each
of its components (xs, Ps) belongs to the Recursive Core of the subgame Γs
to prevent any future deviation.
Now we are ready to define the Sustainable Core by means of the Recursive
Core of suitably chosen subgames.
Definition 6 (Sustainable Core) An outcome (x, P ) belongs to the Sus-
tainable Core of the game Γ , denoted by SC(Γ ), if and only if
(a) (x, P ) is such that (xs, Ps) ∈ RC(Γs) for all s ∈ S,
(b) and there is no coalition R ∈ N forming some partition P˜ (R) ∈ P(R) and
outcome (x˜(R), P˜ (R)) such that (x˜(R)s, P˜ (R)s) ∈ RC(Γs(R)) for all s ∈ S,
and ui(x˜i) > ui(xi) for all i ∈ R.
It means that for an outcome to belong to the Sustainable Core of the
PFU-game Γ, the outcome should belong to the Recursive Core of the PFF-
game Γs in every state s ∈ S. Moreover, no coalition (forming some partition)
should be able to pick an element of the Recursive Core of the game restricted
to R in every state, and in doing so improve utility in an ex ante sense.
Since we require the deviating coalition to pick a Recursive Core element,
no further counter-deviation from it can be expected by any sub-coalition; i.e.
the blocking allocation is indeed self-enforcing.
Note, that if there is no externality, the game boils down to a transferable
utility game with uncertainty, and so the definition of the Sustainable Core
will coincide with that of the Weak Sequential Core. Similarly, if there is no
uncertainty, than we have a single PFF-game with the Recursive Core as the
solution to it.
In a PFU-game one can distinguish ex ante and ex post efficiency.
Definition 7 An outcome (x¯, P¯ ) is ex ante efficient in the game Γ if:
(i)
∑
i∈N x¯
i ≤ w(N, P¯ ), and
(ii) there does not exist an outcome (x, P ) with
∑
i∈N x
i ≤ w(N,P ) such that
ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ N .
Definition 8 An outcome (x¯, P¯ ) is ex post efficient in the game Γ if
∑
i∈N x¯
i =
w(N, P¯ ).
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Note, that the concept of ex post efficiency says more than the usual fea-
sibility conditions in TU-games, since it requires
∑
i∈N x¯
i
s = ws(N, P¯ ) to hold
at all states s ∈ S, but contrary to ex ante efficiency it does not imply Pareto
efficiency, since it does not consider reallocation possibilities across states.
The next observation follows from the Pareto efficiency of the Recursive
Core.
Corollary 1 If (x¯, P¯ ) ∈ SC(Γ ) then (x¯, P¯ ) is ex post efficient.
Note, on the other hand, that outcomes need not be ex ante efficient. Since
binding agreements are not allowed for here, certain utility transfers across
states might not be feasible.
4 Application: Safety Critical Rescheduling of Generators in The
Electrical Power Transmission Network
The modeling of electricity markets (see eg. Kleindorfer et al (2001); Smeers
(2003); Metzler et al (2003); De la Torre et al (2003); Ehrenmann (2004);
Gabriel et al (2004); Oggioni et al (2012); Abrell and Weigt (2012); Leuthold
et al (2012)) has always been one of the most challenging and complex tasks
due to the special physical, engineering and economical aspects of the field. The
liberalization of the electricity markets, and the privatization and restructur-
ing of power systems in the last decades resulted in an increased effort to fully
economically exploit the infrastructure of the power grid. With this trend, the
risk of failures has increased as demonstrated by the large blackouts observed
(Fairley, 2004; Hines et al, 2009). As emphasized by Beccuti et al (2010), the
situation is complicated by the fact that electrical power grids are large in-
terconnected systems covering large areas where the failures of components
or control actions of a regional operator may adversely affect other compo-
nents located hundreds of kilometers away. This observation suggests that the
problem can be modeled by a PFF-game.
To avoid such dramatic consequences as country-wide blackouts, power
system operators use various methodologies to keep the power grid in safe
operational state. The protocols applied in these cases of security arrangements
may affect the electricity market.
In this application we analyze, how the possibly occurring emergency pro-
cedures may be taken into account by the various stakeholders of the electricity
market during the planning of transmission contracts. For the aim of simplicity
we consider only line failures (no generator failures). We have to note that the
method demonstrated here, the application of a PFU-game, can be straight-
forwardly applied to other scenarios of uncertainty; for example to network
expansion scenarios, in which the uncertain expansion (the possible addition
of certain lines) is assumed to be (partially) independent of the market par-
ticipants, who represent the players of the transmission game.
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4.1 PFF-game on The Transmission Network
Previously, a PFF-game for the electrical transmission networks has been de-
fined in (Csercsik and Ko´czy, 2011). The most important features of the ap-
plied transmission model are the following. The admittance values (Y ) and
the injected/consumed energy amounts of the nodes uniquely determine the
energy flows on the edges (branches or lines) of the network, which can be
obtained by the solution of a system of linear equations. In addition to its
admittance value, each edge is characterized by a transfer capacity (q), which
corresponds to the maximal amount of energy which can be transferred on it.
Furthermore, as a most simple approach we neglect transmission losses. For the
sake of simplicity we will assume that every node of the energy transmission
network corresponds to a certain generator or consumer.
If we consider a network with n nodes (generators or consumers) and m
edge, line flows (Q) of a DC load flow model are determined as
Q = BDATB+P (1)
where P is the vector of the generated/consumed power at the nodes, A ∈
Rn×m is the the node-branch incidence matrix of the network, B ∈ Rn×n
denotes the susceptance matrix whose elements are Bkl = −Ykl for the off-
diagonal terms and
Bkk = −
∑
l 6=k
Bkl
(the column sum of off-diagonals) for diagonal elements. Ykl denotes the admit-
tance of the line between nodes k and l.B+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse
of B, and BD is a diagonal matrix with BDkk = Yij .
For further information on DC load flow models, see Oren et al (1995) and
Contreras (1997).
To point out some properties of DC load flow models let us consider the
example with 3 nodes (2 generators, nodes 1 and 3 and 1 consumer, node 2)
and 3 transmission lines. In Figure 1 we can how line admittances determine
the flows of the network. In 1(a) the flow is not constrained by transmission
capacities.
If we double the admittance and maximal transmission capacity between
the nodes 2 and 3 (which can be regarded as the physical duplication of the
power line, shown on Figure 1), the line 1-3 will be overloaded, since the in-
creased overall admittance of line 1-3-2 “draws the flow” onto that branch
from 1-2. Of course a suitable reduction of production and consumption lev-
els leads to a feasible flow as shown on Figure 1(c) , but the example illus-
trates that transmission networks may exhibit Braess’s paradox-like phenom-
ena, where adding local capacities may decrease overall performance. While
Braess’s paradox is due to the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium of a selfish
traffic routing problem, which can be solved by a central planner, here, the pro-
duction/consumption levels, network topology and line admittances uniquely
determine the flows and the sole remedy is the reduction of these levels.
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1
2 3
5
30
35
Y12=5 Y13=2
Y23=3
q13=4.19<q13=5q12=25.81<q12=30
q32=9.19<q32=12
(a)
1
2 3
5
30
35
Y12=5 Y13=2
Y23=2*3
q13=5.96>q13=5q12=24.04<q12=30
q32=10.96<q32=2*12
(b)
1
2 3
5
25.8
30.8
Y12=5 Y13=2
Y23=2*3
q13=5=q13q12=20.8<q12=30
q32=10<q32=2*12
(c)
Fig. 1 Power flow on a simple 3-node network. If we double the connection between 2 and
3, line 1-3 gets overloaded. Y denotes the line admittances. qij denotes the actual power
flow on edge i, j while q¯ij denotes the maximum transmission capacity.
Players of the game correspond to nodes (generators or consumers), while
coalitions of the game correspond to balancing groups for which the total inlet
and outlet power has to be equal. A central independent network regulator
may limit the power in and outlet of the coalitions (in other words reschedule
the generators and curtail the loads) in order to maximize the total power
transmitted by the network and secure the safe operation of the system and
avoid line overloads. As described in (Csercsik and Ko´czy, 2011), maximization
of the total transmitted power can be achieved by the solution of a linear pro-
gramming problem, in which the objective function is the total power injected
in the network, while inequality type constraints correspond to line loads and
the maximal values of generation and consumption rates. Further equality con-
straints correspond to the balance of the coalitions (balancing groups) and the
total balance of the network.
The value of a certain coalition in this setup is determined as twice the
total transmission within the coalition.
In the current paper, based on the defined model, the safety-critical reschedul-
ing of generators and load curtailment in the case of an instantaneous failure
of a single transmission line is analyzed.
Electrical power transmission networks are safety critical systems, which
have to be operated in a fault-tolerant manner. Assuming a basically safe
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operation, in the case of sudden line or generator failure, the flows in the
network change instantaneously, potentially enhancing the vulnerability of the
system. In such cases the rescheduling of the system is needed to prevent
further, possibly more dramatic failures (Thanikachalam and Tudor, 1971;
Kaltenbach and Hajdu, 1971). The problem of network uncertainties is relevant
in the case of network problems of other nature as well (Li et al, 2009; Chen
et al, 2013).
As foreshadowed, in this work we will consider only line failures. Regarding
our DC load flow model defined in (Csercsik and Ko´czy, 2011) this means,
that in the case of basic operation, the power in and outlets of the nodes
have to be determined in a way, that if any line instantaneously fails, none of
the remaining lines may be overloaded. We will call this a safe state of the
system. This network stability requirement may be included in the LP problem
described in eq. 13 of (Csercsik and Ko´czy, 2011), by adding further inequality
type constraints, which describe transfer limitations under line failures.
Basically, in the case of a line failure, the system may loose this stability
property (the failure of an additional more line may lead to network flows,
which exceed the maximum capacity of a certain line, or lines). In this case the
generators of the system need to be rescheduled and the loads are curtailed to
bring the system in a safe state again. This must be done in a way which implies
the minimal total change in generation and consumption values (Kaltenbach
and Hajdu, 1971). In the following we will demonstrate the importance of the
failure induced safety critical rescheduling on a simple 4-node network.
Example
Let us consider the network depicted in Figure 2.
1
2
3
4
(10) (10)
(5) (5)
Y12=1
q12=5
Y13=1
q13=5
Y14=1
q14=5
Y23=0.7
q23=3.5
Y24=1
q24=5
Y12=0.8
q12=4
Fig. 2 The basic structure and parameters of the 4-node network. Yij corresponds to the
admittance value of the line between i and j, while qij denotes the value of the maximal
possible energy transfer on the corresponding line (power transmission capacity). The num-
bers in parentheses at the nodes correspond to maximal generating capacity and desired
consumption.
If we assume the grand coalition to form, which implies only one equality
type constraint corresponding to the balance of total inlet and outlet power,
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the a safe network configuration corresponding to maximal total transmission
(which in this case satisfies all consumers) is depicted in Figure 3a.
1
2
3
4
5.61 (10)  4.39 (10)
5 (5) 5 (5)
2.87 (5)
0.06 (5)
2.80 (5)
2.05 (3.5)
0.08 (5)
2.28 (4)
1
2
3
4
5.61 (10)  4.39 (10)
5 (5) 5 (5)
1.30 (5)
4.31 (5)
3.29 (3.5)
1.71 (5)
2.40 (4)
1
2
3
4
5.61 (10)  4.39 (10)
5 (5) 5 (5)
1.96 (5)
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Fig. 3 Basic (safe) operation of the 4 node network without failures, flows without
rescheduling in the case of the failure of line 1-2, and in the case of the failure of line
1-2 and 2-4: The first failure does not lead to line overload, but without rescheduling the
second failure causes the overload of line 2-3.
Since we assume a stable nominal operation, the line capacities are not
exceeded in the case of the first failure (as depicted in Figure 3b), but without
generator rescheduling and load curtailment after the second failure of line 2-4,
line 2-3 is overloaded (which would lead to further failures). Via overheating
of these lines, this may lead to further avalanche of failures and emergency
shutdowns in critical case, which may lead to costs of billions of $/EUR in most
serious cases (Fairley, 2004).We assume that all generators can be rescheduled,
and all loads can be curtailed - of course this is not the case in a realistic
scenario, where some consumers are treated with priority in general. If we
reschedule the generators and apply load curtailment after the first failure of
line 1-2 in order to bring the network in safe state again (we do this under the
constraint of implying minimal total change in generation values and loads),
the second failure of the line 2-4 will not cause overload of any other lines as
depicted in Figure 4.
1
2
3
4
3.4 (10)  4.1 (10)
3.5 (5) 4 (5)
0.43 (5)
2.97 (5)
2.49 (3.5)
1.01 (5)
2.04 (4)
1
2
3
4
3.4 (10)  4.1 (10)
3.5 (5) 4 (5)
0.82 (5)
2.58 (5)
3.5 (3.5)
1.42 (4)
Fig. 4 Rescheduling of the network after the failure of line 1-2: The second failure of line
2-4 does not overload the remaining lines. Line 2-3 operating on the edge of his capacity
shows, that the rescheduling of generators and the curtailment of loads was justified.
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4.2 The Power Transmission Game with Safety Critical Rescheduling
To define a cooperative game taking into account the uncertainty correspond-
ing to the possible failure of lines, and the implied rescheduling which is causing
changes in the transfer of certain coalitions, we use the formalism defined in
Section 2.
In the case of m lines, each of which may fail, we have S = m+ 1 number
of states of nature in period t = 1. The first state, s = 1, corresponds to
the normal (error-free) operation of the network, and the remaining m states
describe the possible failures of the corresponding m lines. This implies that
we will have m+ 1 state-dependent partition function form games.
We will demonstrate the calculation of the Sustainable Core in the case of
the network depicted in Figure 2. The state-dependent minimal claim function
corresponding to the normal operation and to the failures of certain lines, and
the implied safety critical rescheduling are listed in Table 1. s = 1 corresponds
to the error-free operation of the network, while s = 2 corresponds to the error
of the line 1-2, s = 3 to the error of the line 1-3, s = 4 to the error of the line
1-4, s = 5 to the error of the line 2-3, s = 6 to the error of the line 2-4 and
s = 7 to the error of the line 3-4.
Table 1 Minimal claim function; vmcs
coalition s=1 s=2 s=3 s=4 s=5 s=6 s=7
∅ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
{1} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
{2} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
{3} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
{4} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
{1,2} 10 7 10 7 10 7 9.58
{1,3} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
{1,4} 10 8 10 8 9.97 8 10
{2,3} 10 7 7 7 7.02 7 7
{2,4} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
{3,4} 10 8 7 8 8 8 5.92
{1,2,3} 10 7 10 10 10 7 10
{1,2,4} 17.08 10 10 10 14.44 15 14.12
{1,3,4} 10 10 10 8 10 8 10
{2,3,4} 14.72 13 7 12 8 14.12 7
{1,2,3,4} 20 15 17 15 18 15 17
To evaluate the players’ payoffs, we assume that all four players in our
Example have the following utility function;
ui(xi) = 0.88(1− e−0.001x
i
1) +
s=7∑
s=2
0.02(1− e−0.001x
i
s) for all i ∈ N.
One can interpret this expression as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion, where the probability of error-free operation is 88%, and the probability
of any line failing is 2%.
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Now consider the following allocation:
x =


2.91226 7.08774 2.91226 7.08774
2 5 2 6
5.7565 4.2435 2.7565 4.2435
3 4 3 5
5.51228 4.48772 3.21021 4.78979
0 7 0 8
5.53279 4.36166 2.63834 4.46721


∈ RS×N .
It is easy to show that this allocation belongs to the Sustainable Core of
the above defined game. First, one can check that xs ∈ RC(Γs) holds for all
s ∈ S, thus there is no blocking possibility in time period t = 1. Now we only
need to see if Part (b) of Definition 6 holds. We show next that x maximizes
the sum of the players’ utilities over allocations xC with xCs ∈ RC(Γ
C
s ) for all
s ∈ S.
Consider the following constrained maximization problem,
max
xC
∑
i∈C
ui(xi)
s.t.
∑
i∈C
xis = v
mc
s (C), s ∈ S, (2)
∑
i∈D
xis ≥ v
mc
s (D), s ∈ S, ∅ 6= D ( C, (3)
where condition (2) is required for ex post efficiency and inequality (3) is a
no-blocking condition. A solution to the maximization problem maximizes the
sum of the players’ utilities among those allocations that belong to RC(ΓCs )
for all s ∈ S. Since the given allocation x is a solution to this problem, it
follows that there is no blocking possible in period t = 0 either.
Hence, x ∈ SC(Γ ).
It is worthwhile to note that this outcome is not really sensitive to the
exact choice of the utility functions; e.g. the given x would also be a solution
if the utility functions were
ui(xi) = 0.4(1− e−0.01x
i
1) +
s=7∑
s=2
0.1(1− e−0.01x
i
s) for all i ∈ N.
This example demonstrates that using a cooperative game and the concept
of the Sustainable Core may help us to find such stable solutions to such
difficult problems as the safety-critical operation of the power transmission
networks that take into account possible line failures as well. This solution
may be used in reality to facilitate immediate reaction to possible failures,
which might lead to disastrous outcomes if reaching an agreement after the
failure would take any time.
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5 Conclusion
While in numerous real-life situations agreements have to be achieved in an
environment with externalities and uncertainty about the future, the coopera-
tive game theory literature has not considered this scenario yet. In this paper
we introduced a new class of games, the partition function form games with
uncertainty, to provide a framework to analyze these problems. We also pro-
posed the Sustainable Core to solve the game, which is an extension of the
Recursive Core and the Weak Sequential Core to this more complex setup.
As a possible application we analyzed the game of consumers and gener-
ators on a lossless DC load flow model of the electrical energy transmission
network. While the described safety critical rescheduling of generators and
curtailment of loads in the case of an arising line failure is a pure technological
approach to avoid further overloads and shutdowns, dealing with its possibil-
ity in energy transmission contracts raises economical questions, for which the
concept of the introduced sustainable core may serve as a possible solution
concept. In this concept we assumed that the probabilities of line failures are
known to each player of the game. A straightforward possible future scenario
could be to analyze how asymmetric information affects the results. In most of
the practical cases, regional generators have detailed information only about
the network parameters in their area. Players who can obtain information
about other areas may possibly effectively increase their bargaining potential
and expected payoff compared to others.
The proposed framework may serve as a solution for many problems from
environmental agreements to the formation of trading blocks or common pool
resource allocation issues.
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